Execute and attest: each executor runs acceptance with its own renderer and sandbox, and signs into its own event chain the hashes of the task, the candidate, the suite and the rendered result, along with the visible acceptance result.
Tally: first check whether the suite passed the gauge, then verify the testimony one entry at a time. The same executor signing two testimonies with different content for the same event → proof-grade fault, voided.
Vote and name: decided by majority. Votes short of a quorum, or a tie → undecided, and the shipping rule treats undecided as not passed. The minority is listed by name, with its event hash and signature attached.
An attacker wrote a stateful variant of the gauge: the gauge scored perfectly in both directions, yet the delivery rate dropped 75 percentage points. The fix was to leave the suite with only three things: a dialect, an entry-point name, and a literal list of input — expected value pairs.
194 receipt chains, 9,841 entries, all verify. But the offline single-file viewer has a structural limit: if the whole chain is re-minted once, it still passes. This is not a vulnerability; it is the definitional boundary of a signature.
All three layers of anti-vote-stuffing defense were in place, yet a collusion group that never delivered anything bad and only reviewed others took almost all of the routing — and its score is 0. The harm was not underestimated; it was measured as zero.
We originally claimed that "raising the audit rate cannot rescue cases with a blind spot." Measured: at blind spot 0.5, raising the audit rate from 0.1 to 1.0 cut the attacker's total hits by 82%, p = 5.5e-6. The three factors are terms in the same product.
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Department of Information and Communications, Shih Hsin University · 2026 capstone project · on-site exhibition
