An attacker re-mints the whole chain with their own key, and the receipt viewer still says it passes

#Three things chain verification can't catch

#R455: the limit of the offline viewer

We built a single-file offline viewer with zero external resources and zero network requests. The receipts are embedded in the file, and opening it directly via file:// runs the full chain verification:

Then we attacked it:

#Why this is not a vulnerability that can be fixed

This sentence has a sharper version over in multi-party execution:

A signature identifies a key, not a principal. A majority of keys is not a majority of independent principals.

#The mitigation

#Why we chose to state it clearly instead of fixing it

#What this means for the definition of "accountable"

Back to the definition itself

Our definition is: the traceability and verifiability of events signed by a specific key (original: 「特定金鑰所簽署之事件的可追溯與可核驗性。」).}}

#Honest boundaries

#Next

• The naming mechanism and its mathematical upper bound: named-dissent
• The five-level receipt vocabulary and its levels: Receipts
• Why "accountable" is not the same as "trustworthy": Accountability layer